Determinants of Penal Policies by Tonry, Michael
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2007 
Determinants of Penal Policies 
Michael Tonry 
University of Minnesota Law School, tonry001@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 36 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2007), available at 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/497. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
Michael Tonry
Determinants of Penal
Policies
Many of the generalizations bandied about in discussions of penal pol-
icy in Western countries are not true. If penal populism (Pratt 2007)
or populist punitiveness (Bottoms 1995) exists at all, it is mostly as
reifications in academics' minds of other academics' ideas. Imprison-
ment rates have not risen substantially everywhere in the last fifteen
years. Penal policies are not becoming harsher everywhere. Some pol-
icies in some places have become harsher, but in most places this is
offset by changes in practice that moderate and sometimes nullify the
policy changes, and by other policy changes that move in the opposite
direction. If a few governments are moving in illiberal directions in
relation to the procedural rights of defendants, most are moving to
strengthen their procedural rights and protections (Snacken 2005). If
with things such as antisocial behavior orders (Morgan 2006) in En-
gland and three-strikes laws in America (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin
2001), some governments are adopting primarily "expressive" policies
without concern for their iatrogenic effects, most governments are not.
In countries in which most or some penal policies have become more
severe, the reasons are not rising crime rates, increased awareness of
risk, globalization, or the conditions of late modernity, but rather dis-
tinctive cultural, historical, constitutional, and political conditions. Tip
O'Neill, for many years speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
famously observed that "all politics are local." So are penal cultures
and policies.
All Western countries in recent decades experienced rising then fall-
Errors of analysis or fact in this introduction are alas my own, but I am grateful to
the following people who kindly read an earlier draft and helped me avoid some errors
and tried to save me from others: Jean-Paul Brodeur, Anthony Doob, David Downes,
Richard Frase, David Green, Ren6 Levy, Sebastian Roch6, and Ren6 van Swaaningen.
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ing crime rates, major economic and social dislocations, and the con-
geries of anxieties and attitudes some associate with "late modernity"
and postmodernist angst. Everywhere some political parties raised
crime control as a campaign issue, and public attitudes toward crime
and criminals at times hardened. Despite all those similarities, the de-
terminants and characteristics of penal policies remain curiously local.
In the United States, crime rates rose from the late 1960s through
the early 1990s. Then they fell substantially, and almost continuously,
to levels not seen for a third of a century. Imprisonment rates began
to rise in 1973 and have risen ever since. To many people, it probably
appears obvious that those trends are connected. During the first pe-
riod in which both crime and imprisonment rose, more crimes might
be expected mechanically to have produced more arrests, prosecutions,
convictions, prison sentences, and prisoners. It probably seems inevi-
table that policy makers toughened up by enacting mandatory mini-
mum, truth-in-sentencing, and three-strikes laws in order to deter and
incapacitate offenders and respond to heightened public anxiety.
After American crime rates began their steady decline in the early
1990s, to many it may have seemed self-evident that larger prison pop-
ulations and tougher punishments caused crime rates to fall, that im-
prisonment use should remain high as insurance against a future up-
turn, and that policy makers, entirely sensibly, have kept in place the
policies that drove crime down and filled the prisons. When compar-
isons are made between the experiences of the United States and those
of other countries, however, it becomes obvious that what appears self-
evident in recent American experience is not self-evident elsewhere.
Crime rates in the other English-speaking countries and most Eu-
ropean countries also rose from the 1960s through the early to mid
1990s and after that fell, or stabilized, or alternated between decline
and stability (van Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2001; Tonry
2004b; Aebi et al. 2006; van Dijk et al. 2007). If the American conven-
tional wisdom about relations between crime and imprisonment were
true, the seemingly inexorable increase in imprisonment that the
United States experienced should have occurred everywhere.
It didn't. Only in the Netherlands did imprisonment rates contin-
uously increase after 1973, albeit from such a lower base (18 per
100,000 compared with 150-160) that a sevenfold increase produced a
rate around 134 per 100,000 in 2004, well below the American starting
point and less than a fifth of the then-American rate of nearly 725 per
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100,000 (Downes and van Swaaningen 2007). England and New Zea-
land have followed the U.S. and Dutch pattern of continuous increase,
but only since the mid-1990s (Newburn, in this volume; Pratt 2007).
In other countries, imprisonment rate trends varied widely. In Fin-
land, rates fell by two-thirds between 1965 and the early 1990s and
then stabilized; elsewhere in Scandinavia they fluctuated between 60
and 80 per 100,000 (Lappi-Seppiihi, in this volume). In Japan, they fell
steadily for decades but in more recent years have turned upward
(Johnson, in this volume). In Germany, Canada, and Belgium, impris-
onment rates were basically flat in the final quarter of the twentieth
century (Weigend 2001; Snacken, in this volume; Webster and Doob,
in this volume). In France they fluctuated between peaks and troughs
caused by frequent use of pardons and amnesties (Levy, in this volume;
Roch6, in this volume).
Any assumption or hypothesis, therefore, that there is a simple, com-
mon, or invariant relationship between the crime patterns that befall a
country and the number of people it confines is wrong. Faced with
similar crime trends, different countries react in different ways.
Even so capacious a scholar as David Garland in 1996 described
developments in crime control policy in contemporary Britain "and
elsewhere," implicitly assuming that the crime trends, social forces, and
political pressures afflicting England and the United States were af-
fecting other developed countries in similar ways. Hans-J6rg Albrecht,
the distinguished director of Germany's Max Planck Institute on In-
ternational and Comparative Penal Law, noted the "and elsewhere" and
sardonically observed of such generalizations that they derived their
strength solely from "forgetting about the 'and elsewhere"' (2001, p.
294).
Garland pulled back in his magisterial The Culture of Control (2001)
and observed that similar stressors need not produce the same results
in different countries.1 It was not, however, unreasonable in the mid-
'Not everyone has learned this: "Toward the end of the twentieth century, a clear
pattern seemed to be emerging in crime control policy in modern society. On the one
hand, the state had been prepared to respond to concerns about monstrous criminals and
demonic others with increasingly severe penalties; on the other there was a strategy of
'defining deviance down' . . . . [More recently,] the punishment of the monstrous...
has become significantly more severe as liberal restraints . . . have been pushed aside.
At the same time, 'minor deviations' are no longer 'defined down' (Pratt 2007, pp.
94-95). That is not the picture most of the essays in this volume paint of particular
countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom (and, per Pratt, New
Zealand). See, e.g., the essays by Green, Lappi-SeppAi, Roch, Snacken, and Webster
and Doob in this volume.
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1990s for Garland to have assumed that many or most developed coun-
tries would follow America's policy lead, as England as early as 1993
appeared to be doing and by 2004 transparently had done (Tonry
2004a; Newburn 2006; Morgan and Downes 2007). In the mid-1990s
there was next to no comparative literature on crime control or penal
policy. There were only two important works in criminology. David
Downes's Contrasts in Tolerance (1988) compared Dutch and English
postwar policies through the mid-1980s, arguing that Holland's more
humane policies and practices resulted from differences in the views of
national policy elites. Joachim Savelsberg (1994) compared German
and American crime policies and politics and stressed the importance
of German practitioners' greater insulation from public attitudes and
emotions compared with their elected or politically appointed coun-
terparts in the United States. Outside criminology, political scientists
studying comparative political cultures occasionally mentioned crime
in passing, but their principal interests were elsewhere (e.g., Lijphart
1984, 1999), and few criminologists were familiar with their work.2
Since the mid-1990s, however, a literature has begun to emerge.
Garland gets part of the credit for this; his 2001 book attracted enor-
mous attention and provoked many to try to refute, qualify, and amplify
his analyses. Credit also goes to an increasingly international scholarly
world in which more people are motivated to look across national
boundaries in order to see more clearly what is happening within their
own. The results include lengthening lists of comparative books (e.g.,
Whitman 2003; Tonry 2004b; Cavadino and Dignan 2005; Pratt 2007;
Green, forthcoming), comparative collections (e.g., Clarkson and Mor-
gan 1995; Tonry and Frase 2001; Tonry and Doob 2004; Pratt et al.
2005; Armstrong and McAra 2006; Newburn and Rock 2006) and nu-
merous articles (many published in Punishment and Society). There are
also a few books tracing policy developments in one or two countries
(Windlesham 1987-96 [England and Wales]; Windlesham 1998
[United States]; Dunbar and Langdon 1998 [England and Wales]; Gar-
land 2001 [England and Wales, the United States]; Faulkner 2002 [En-
gland and Wales]; Ryan 2003 [England and Wales]; Tonry 2004b
[United States]; Tonry 2004a [England and Wales]; Boutellier 2005
[Netherlands]; Buruma 2005 [Netherlands]; Gottschalk 2006 [United
States]; Jones and Newburn 2006 [England and Wales]; Roch6 2006
2 Green (in this volume, forthcoming) is a notable exception.
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[France]; Simon 2007 [United States]). Others no doubt are on the
way.
This essay takes stock of the literature as it now stands. The aims
are to search for generalizations-there are some-that help explain
national differences in penal policies and practices and to suggest ways
to build on what we now (tentatively) know. Section I does some
ground clearing, focusing on the dependent variable, the thing to be
explained. Imprisonment rates per 100,000 population provide the
usual metric. Whether such rates by themselves, however, are the only,
the best, or even plausible measures of penal policy differences is
doubtful.
Use of any single measure of punitiveness is incomplete and often
misleading. A mix of policies, practices, procedures, and outcomes
needs to be considered before generalizations about particular coun-
tries can sensibly be offered. Among important indicators are the pro-
motion, enactment, and effectuation of harsher policies, whether
harsher policies are broadly or narrowly focused, whether and in what
ways practices change in response to new policies, and whether harsher
policies and practices characterize both the juvenile and adult systems
or only one of them. When multiple criteria are used, it becomes ap-
parent that the United States and England are in a class by themselves
in moving toward harsher penal systems across the board. Although
many countries have recently adopted policies that are on their faces
harsher than those they supplant, most have made comparatively fewer
and much more tightly focused changes. In many countries, practices
have not become conspicuously more severe.
Section HI sets out a framework for thinking about the determinants
of penal policies, stealing from developmental psychology the concepts
of risk and protective factors. Few people disagree that some behaviors,
such as childhood pregnancy, drug dependence, and serious antisocial
behavior, are undesirable. Knowing what factors make their occurrence
more likely and what factors protect against them may make it possible
more often to prevent them. That something is a risk factor does not
mean that the unwanted outcome is inevitable, but that the likelihood
is greater than were the factor not present. The comparative literature
on penal policy identifies characteristics of countries that make them
more or less likely to adopt punitive policies or to adopt more or less
punitive policies. It also identifies nonfactors, things that by themselves
do not explain anything about penal policy.
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The assumption underlying use of the risk and protective factors
framework is that increases in punitiveness are generally undesirable.
That may not always be true or widely agreed on. Reasonable people
can, of course, disagree about the desirability of particular forms of
punishment and whether punishments should be made severer in par-
ticular times and places for particular crimes and categories of offend-
ers. Many American criminal justice professionals and scholars, how-
ever, believe that modern American imprisonment rates are highly
undesirable, and that many punishment policies including capital pun-
ishment, life sentences without possibility of parole, three-strikes laws,
and lengthy mandatory minimum sentence laws are unjust and unwise
(e.g., Gottschalk 2006; Simon 2007). Many English criminal justice
professionals and scholars feel the same way about English imprison-
ment rates and punishment policies (e.g., Morgan and Downes 2007).
Situations elsewhere vary from country to country, as the essays in this
volume demonstrate. Almost everywhere, however, many professionals
and scholars believe that the use of imprisonment should be avoided
to the extent possible and that punishments should be moderate, re-
strained, proportionate, and respectful of offenders' human rights.
The main section, Section II1, distills a series of generalizations
about national characteristics that increase risks of adopting (unnec-
essarily) punitive policies or protect against them and about character-
istics that lack explanatory power. Prominent risk factors include "con-
flict" political systems, elected judges and prosecutors, sensationalist
journalism, Anglo-Saxon political cultures, and a populist view that
criminal justice policy should be strongly influenced by public senti-
ment and partisan politics. Other comparative risk factors are relatively
greater income inequality, relatively weaker social welfare systems,
lower levels of trust in fellow citizens and government, and relatively
lower levels of perceived legitimacy of legal institutions.
Prominent protective factors include consensus political systems,
nonpartisan judges and prosecutors, Francophonic political cultures,
and a predominant view that criminal justice policy falls appropriately
within the province of expert knowledge and professional experience.
Among the characteristics that lack explanatory power are crime rates
and trends, population heterogeneity, globalization, and existentialist
angst.
Section IV suggests ways we might test what we think we know and
ways we might learn more. What is needed now is a combination of
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genuinely comparative studies, in place of the single-country descrip-
tions and analyses that constitute nearly all the existing literature, and
studies that examine and try to explain a much wider range of penal
characteristics than simply imprisonment rates.
I. Measuring Punitiveness
A modest but growing literature examines the determinants of penal
policy or attempts to explain why punishment policies, practices, and
outcomes have become harsher in recent decades or years in some
countries, particularly the United States and England. The preceding
sentence uses two phrases-"penal policy" and "punishment policies,
practices, and outcomes"-to describe the phenomena to be explained.
The second, which unpacks the first, is better, but in the interest of
conciseness I mostly refer to penal policy.
Much current writing attempts to explain national differences in pe-
nal policy, generally taken to be represented by differences in impris-
onment rates, or in "penality," "punitiveness," "punitivism," or "puni-
tivity." These are all ugly words.3 Usually the thing being described is
left vague; what is usually meant is an unspecified mix of attitudes,
enactments, motivations, policies, practices, and ways of thinking that
taken together express greater intolerance of deviance and deviants,
and greater support for harsher policies and severer punishments. The
imprisonment rate, the number of people held in prison on an average
day or an annual census count day per 100,000 population, is often
used as a primary measure of punitiveness.
There are plausible reasons to use the imprisonment rate, though it
is but one possible measure. Its advantages are that it is readily avail-
able,4 is calculated more or less consistently over time and space, and
is a measure of diverse practices and policies that collectively result in
a state imposing greater or lesser aggregate suffering on its residents
in the names of deserved punishment and crime prevention.
'Calling to mind C. S. Lewis's quip in "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment"
about "the 'expert penologist' (let barbarous things have barbarous names)" (reprinted
in Lewis [1970]).
'The Home Office for some years annually published rates for many countries; the
series has been taken over by the International Centre for Prison Studies (ICPS) (e.g.,
Walmsley 2007). The ICPS publishes latest rates on its Web site (http://www
.prisonstudies.org). The Council of Europe produces annual reports on prison use for
countries belonging to the council. Forty-four of forty-six member states participated in
the 2005 survey (Aebi and Stadnic 2007).
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Despite this, care needs to be taken in comparing imprisonment
rates. What look to be comparable rates often are not. Many countries,
for example, include only imprisoned adults in their calculations. In
Finland and Sweden, however, which have no separate juvenile justice
systems, prison population totals include fifteen- to seventeen-year-
olds. That does not distort their rates much because few young people
are sent to prison. In the United States, where some states lowered the
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction to fifteen, sixteen, or sev-
enteen, and many juveniles in other states are transferred to adult
courts to be tried, the adult prisons contain many thousands of juve-
niles. The Netherlands for some reason includes juveniles confined
under both civil and criminal laws in the prison population it reports
to the Council of Europe. As a result the "official" imprisonment rate
in 2004 was 134 per 100,000; when juveniles and a few other nontypical
categories are excluded, the 2004 rate was fewer than 100 per 100,000,
which makes the increase in imprisonment in that country considerably
less than is commonly recognized (Tonry and Bijleveld 2007). Whether
immigrants confined for illegal entry (in most European countries not
a criminal offense) are included can distort comparisons in similar
ways.
5
There are also things to be said against using the imprisonment rate.
It combines figures for pretrial detainees6 and convicted, sentenced
offenders. It obscures relations among convictions, prison admissions,
and sentence lengths. An increasing imprisonment rate can reflect in-
creasing numbers of people convicted, rising chances that convicted
offenders are sentenced to imprisonment, lengthening prison terms,
changes in release policies, or combinations of some or all of these.
The overall imprisonment rate also obscures changes in sentencing
patterns for different offenses: rape sentences might be becoming more
severe and shoplifting less so, for example, a bifurcation some people
s And at least at the margins, national imprisonment rates vary in their inclusion of
particular categories of confined people: illegal aliens and others confined for noncriminal
violations of immigration laws, mentally ill offenders, young offenders convicted in adult
courts, and young offenders beneath the age of majority. Comparisons involving the
United States are bedeviled by America's multiple levels of government. American and
non-American scholars alike often compare the oranges of aggregate European impris-
onment rates with the apples of American imprisonment rates for sentenced prisoners
serving terms of one year or more in state and federal prisons, thereby disregarding the
additional 30-35 percent of prisoners in pretrial detention or serving sentences shorter
than one year.
6 Typically called "remand prisoners" outside the United States.
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would celebrate. Data in most national statistical systems can be dis-
aggregated in these ways, as many of the essays in this volume dem-
onstrate.
A different critique of using the imprisonment rate as the primary
measure of punitiveness is that gross imprisonment may be a mislead-
ing or even perverse measure. This critique takes two forms. The older
one is that, especially in a time of rising crime rates, imprisonment
rates per se may be importantly misleading (Pease 1991; Young and
Brown 1993; Kommer 1994, 2004). A slightly rising imprisonment rate
during a period of rapidly rising crime rates might indicate not harsher
but softer average punishments. Other, better, measures might include
the probability of imprisonment and average days of imprisonment
served, in the aggregate or disaggregated by types of offense, relative
to victimizations, recorded crimes, arrests, prosecutions, convictions,
or (for sentence length) prison sentences.7 Were some of these indi-
cators used, especially relative to victimizations and recorded crimes,
especially in 1975-95, time series would show that many criminal jus-
tice systems became less punitive, not more (e.g., Young and Brown
1993).
International punitiveness rankings vary substantially depending on
the indicator used. If annual prison admission rates per capita are the
basis of comparison, for example, rather than imprisonment rates,
rankings change radically. Max Kommer (1994) and Warren Young and
Mark Brown (1993) some time ago showed that some European coun-
tries, which impose many short prison sentences, rather than fewer but
longer ones as in the United States, top the international punitiveness
league tables when annual admissions per capita are the measure, even
though they are near the bottom when imprisonment rates per capita
are the measure.8 Table 1 shows rankings by imprisonment (1990) and
admission (1987) rates per 100,000 population calculated for seven
Western countries by Young and Brown (1993). The Netherlands and
Sweden had the lowest and second-lowest imprisonment rates in 1990
but in 1987 had the second- and third-highest rates per 100,000 of
prison admissions for sentenced offenders. By a wide margin Sweden
had the highest total prison admission rates of all seven countries
'The essays in Tonry and Farrington (2005) report changes in many of these measures
over twenty years for eight countries.
'Among Western and developed countries, Scandinavian imprisonment rates, typically
60-80 per 100,000 in recent years, are high compared with the rates of 30-40 per 100,000
that characterize many Asian countries (Walmsley 2007).
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(Dutch remand admission rates were not available). Kommer's analysis
(1994, table 1) also included Denmark, which then had an imprison-
ment rate lower than Sweden's, the second-lowest among eleven coun-
tries, but the third-highest total rate for prison admissions (after Swe-
den and Northern Ireland).
A newer critique is that imprisonment rates narrowly, or punishment
policies and practices more broadly, are by themselves incomplete and
often misleading. Sonja Snacken (2005) pointed out that, whatever
their divergent recent imprisonment patterns, all European countries
having the death penalty abolished it in recent decades and strength-
ened human rights protections of suspects and convicted offenders,
suggesting that analyses of punitiveness that consider only imprison-
ment miss much that is important.
Sebastian Roch6 (in this volume) offers a similar critique of the im-
prisonment rate, demonstrating that French imprisonment rates have
increased somewhat in the past twenty-five years and would have in-
creased substantially more save for frequent large-scale amnesties and
pardons. During the same period, however, France abolished the death
penalty, established a wide array of diversion programs and alternative
sentences, insulated juvenile offenders from increases in punishment
severity, enacted no mandatory penalty laws, and held to a cross-party
consensus view that imprisonment is an undesirable thing to be avoided
to the extent possible.
In the Netherlands, the only country that increased its imprisonment
rates as much as or more than the United States in recent decades,
sentencing policies per se were not made harsher. Policies for dealing
with young offenders, however, were toughened in the 1990s and waiv-
ers to the adult court were made easier. In practice, fewer young of-
fenders were transferred to adult courts, and fewer young offenders
were sent to prison (Junger-Tas 2004). Canada, likewise, made transfers
of juveniles to adult courts easier during the 1990s only to see the
incidence of transfers decline (Doob and Sprott 2004). Go figure.
Use of multiple measures gives a better basis for comparing national
differences in punitiveness, or changes in punitiveness over time in a
single country, than any single indicator does. The resulting compar-
isons, however, are more complex and conclusions harder to draw. In
both France and the United States during the period 1990-99, prison
admissions stabilized or fell, but average sentence lengths increased
overall and when controlling for offense (Blumstein and Beck 1999;
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Roch6, in this volume). Reasonable people might disagree as to which
approach is more punitive: sending more people to prison for shorter
periods or fewer for longer.
So far I have described differences in policies (e.g., capital punish-
ment, mandatory minimums, juvenile waivers, alternatives to impris-
onment), practices (e.g., use of waivers, changes in prison admissions),
and outcomes (e.g., prison population and admission rates, sentence
lengths). Procedures also matter. In much of western Europe, under
the influence of the European Convention and Court of Human Rights
(Kurki 2001; Snacken 2005) and the Torture Convention (Morgan
2001), countries have been strengthening procedural protections af-
forded criminal defendants. In England, the Labour government has
recently systematically weakened defendants' procedural protections,
including abolishing the double jeopardy rule, weakening prophylactic
evidentiary rules, and narrowing jury trial rights (Tonry 2004a, chap.
1). Likewise in the United States, the U.S. Congress and Supreme
Court over the past thirty years have systematically reduced procedural
protections (e.g., weakening controls over police searches and seizures,
limiting or eliminating habeas corpus protections, weakening jury trial
rights, greatly narrowing prisoners' ability to challenge prison condi-
tions).
Finally, comparisons of changes in penal policy need to differentiate
among their enactment, their implementation, and their practical use.
Sometimes policies are enacted to send messages, to make expressive
or symbolic statements with no clear expectation that they will be im-
plemented. Conservative Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato (NY),
for example, in 1991 proposed changes to federal mandatory minimum
sentence laws that professional prosecutors said were unenforceable.
According to New York Times reporter Gwen Ifill, "Mr. D'Amato con-
ceded that his two successful amendments, which Justice Department
officials said would have little practical effect on prosecution of crimes,
might not solve the problem. 'But,' he said, 'it does bring about a sense
that we are serious"' (Ifill 1991, p. A6). David Garland (2001) has
brought increased attention to expressive policy making. Sometimes,
nothing more than expression is meant. This may be why waivers to
adult courts of young offenders in Canada declined after the Canadian
Parliament enacted laws making waiver easier (Doob and Sprott 2004).
This may also explain the English practice in which new criminal laws
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often do not take effect automatically; they take effect only if and when
the Home Secretary of the day elects to put them into force.9
Even when new laws are implemented, sometimes they are not ap-
plied, or they are applied only occasionally. The history of mandatory
sentencing laws in England and America is full of examples from the
eighteenth century to the present of laws that practitioners declined to
apply (e.g., Tonry 1996, chap. 5). Sometimes prosecutors exercise dis-
cretion not to file charges under new laws or to insist on the penalties
they prescribe. Other times, lawyers, judges, and juries adapt their ways
of doing business to avoid applying laws they believe to be unjust.
Sometimes enactment and implementation of new laws, even laws pol-
icy makers want applied, make no practical difference in how the justice
system operates.
There are thus numerous ways in which a legal system can be said
to be more or less punitive compared with other systems or with itself
at other times.'" Informative comparative analyses would take account
of them all. Table 2 lists a range of measures of increased (or decreased)
punitiveness that a rich account of the evolution of penal policy in an
individual country would at minimum incorporate.
HI. Risk and Protective Factors
The development of problem behaviors and delinquency over the life
course is often described as a function of interactions between risk and
protective factors. Truancy and school failure, adolescent pregnancy
and paternity, drug and alcohol abuse, and delinquency are things that
nearly everyone considers unfortunate. Some characteristics of children
(e.g., impulsivity, aggressiveness, low IQ) and their environments (e.g.,
criminal or abusive parents, inconsistent discipline, delinquent peers)
make unfortunate outcomes more likely. These are called risk factors.
Other characteristics (e.g., good parenting, above-average household
'Many people expected that the then-new Labour government would not put into
force three mandatory minimum sentence laws enacted in the final days of John Major's
last government. They were put into force (Morgan and Downes 2007).
"There are other ways as well. Deeper functionalist analyses might look not at the
imprisonment rate (however defined) but at the fraction of the overall population in some
kind of confinement, including mental health and juvenile institutions of all kinds (e.g.,
van Ruller and Beijers 1995; Harcourt 2006). Nils Christie (1968) and Alfred Blumstein
and Jacqueline Cohen (1973) developed arguments for Scandinavia and the United States
that societies have natural levels of confinement that are stable over time, at least over
the three-quarters of a century that preceded their articles' publication.
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TABLE 2
Measures of Punitiveness
Policies:
1. Capital punishment (authorization)
2. Mandatory minimum sentence laws (enactment)
3. Laws increasing sentence lengths (enactment)
4. Pretrial/preventive detention (authorization)
5. Prison alternatives (creation)
6. Juvenile waiver to adult courts (authorization)
7. Weakened procedural protections (enactment)
Practices:
1. Patterns of use of policies 1-7
2. Adult prison population and admission rates over
time
a. Disaggregated for pretrial and sentenced
prisoners
b. Disaggregated by offense for sentence lengths
and admission rates
3. juvenile institutional population and admission
rates over time
a. Disaggregated for pretrial and sentenced juve-
nile offenders
b. Disaggregated by offense for sentence lengths
and admission rates
Procedures: Patterns of use of procedural protections
income, good schools, church participation) make undesirable out-
comes less likely despite the presence of risk factors (Dekovi6 1999).
These are called protective factors. Protective factors have a positive
effect under conditions of risk."
By analogy the risk and protective factors framework can be used to
understand changes in punitiveness. David Green (in this volume)
shows that sensationalistic tabloid newspapers have shaped public at-
titudes and knowledge in England and Wales in ways that conduce to
adoption of more punitive policies and practices; sensationalistic media
thus may be a risk factor. Green also argues that countries with "con-
sensus" political cultures are less likely to adopt more punitive penal
" There are other factors that increase the chance of a positive outcome under all
conditions. Sameroff (1998) proposed that these be called "promotive" factors. A pro-
motive effect does not result from interaction, but lies in the positive end of a risk
dimension (Stouthamer-Loeber et al. 2002). Because the comparative penal policy lit-
erature consists mostly of case studies, the distinction between protective and promotive
factors is too elusive to be usable, even by analogy. Having noted the distinction, I set
it aside and use the term "protective factor" to describe factors that might be one or the
other.
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policies than countries with "majoritarian" or "conflict" political cul-
tures. Consensus political culture would thus be a protective factor.
James Whitman (2003) and I (Tonry 1999, 2004b) have argued that
constitutional structural arrangements that insulate practitioners from
electoral politics and public emotion produce less punitive punishment
systems and practices and would therefore count as a protective factor.
The risk and protective factors framework is probabilistic and dy-
namic. That a risk factor is present does not make an unwanted out-
come inevitable; it means that the chances of an unwanted outcome
are greater than they would otherwise be. The presence of a protective
factor does not mean that an unwanted outcome will be avoided, only
that its likelihood will be reduced. Risk and protective factors are iden-
tified so that they can be addressed, in order to change the likelihood
of unwanted outcomes.
When one applies the framework to analyses of penal policy, it is
important to note its probabilism and dynamism. That majoritarian
political systems are risk factors does not mean that countries charac-
terized by them will inexorably and inevitably be highly punitive. Can-
ada, for example, has a majoritarian political system but has long had
stable and relatively nonpunitive policies. Finland, by contrast, has a
consensus political system but, despite its modern standing as an icon
of humane and moderate policies, for half a century its policies were
vastly more severe than those of other Scandinavian countries. Policies
and practices change over time in reaction to many influences. Risk
and protective factors affect how much they change and in what di-
rections.
Every country experiences long-term developments (e.g., rising
crime rates, changing public attitudes and opinions) and moral panics
associated with sensational incidents (e.g., the James Bulger killing in
England, the Dutroux kidnappings and murders of young girls in Bel-
gium, the Polly Klaas kidnapping and murder in the United States).
However, they respond in different ways over time and in particular
times. Many people identify the Bulger case, and reactions to it, as
heralding a sea change in English penal politics and policies (Newburn,
in this volume). The Polly Klaas case led directly to enactment of
California's three-strikes law and indirectly to enactment of these laws
in half the American states (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001). The
Dutroux case, although it brought hundreds of thousands of Belgians
onto the streets, did not lead to fundamental changes in Belgian pol-
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icies or practices (Snacken, in this volume). These different results il-
lustrate differing degrees of national susceptibility to overreaction. Dif-
ferent mixes of risk and protective actors are a major part of the
explanation.
III. Determinants of Penal Policy
The more closely we look at something, the more complex we usually
realize it is. Evolving understanding of penal policy changes in Western
countries is like that. At first, the reasons why American imprisonment
rates rose rapidly and why policy makers adopted increasingly severe
policies seemed straightforward: crime rates rose, the public demanded
action, and policy makers and practitioners responded (e.g., Wilson
1983; Bennett, Dilulio, and Walters 1996). When it became apparent
that those explanations were too simple, subtler and more complex
analyses invoked deeper economic and social changes affecting modern
societies (e.g., Garland 2001). Those explanations also came to seem
too simple because they implied that ubiquitous structural changes
(economic disruption, globahzation, large-scale migration, increased
population diversity, rising crime rates, increasing awareness of risks)
should have produced comparable policy responses in all developed
countries, and patently they had not (e.g., Tonry 2004b, chap. 2). The
latest inquiries look cross-nationally at characteristics of particular
countries that seem to have shaped the different ways they responded
to long-term rises in crime rates and widely experienced structural
changes in modern society. The risk and protective factors paradigm
provides a framework for doing that. Candidate determinants of penal
policy fall into three categories: nonfactors, risk factors, and protective
factors.
A. Nonfactors
Most of the things commonly invoked to explain increased puni-
tiveness-rising crime rates, harsher public attitudes, cynical politi-
cians, ethnic tensions, rapid social and economic change, postmod-
ernist angst, "penal populism" (Pratt 2007)-cannot sensibly be
characterized as risk factors. Because every Western country experi-
enced those developments, they cannot provide a basis for explaining
widely divergent policy trends in different countries. Imprisonment
rates climbed steeply over the past thirty years in the Netherlands and
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the United States, held steady in Canada and Norway, fell sharply in
Finland and Japan through the 1990s, and zigzagged in France. Risk
factors in developmental psychology are characteristics of individuals
or their environments that place them at higher risk of unwanted out-
comes than individuals who do not share those characteristics. A risk
factor that characterized every individual under study, for example,
gender in a sample of men, could provide no guidance. That is why I
describe developments that characterize all countries as nonfactors.
Though it might seem a priori that rising crime rates (and other
things mentioned in the preceding paragraph) increase the likelihood
that a country will adopt more punitive policies than theretofore, this
is true only in a trivial sense. Whether countries adopt more punitive
policies turns on country-specific characteristics. Some of these char-
acteristics make increased punitiveness more likely. Others make it less
likely. Still others make any simple generalization suspect.
The nonfactors include social and economic changes experienced by
most developed countries since 1970 that are said to be associated with
increases in "populist punitiveness" (Bottoms 1995), politicization of
crime policy, adoption of more punitive policies, and increasingly pu-
nitive practices. They include steeply rising crime and victimization
rates through the 1990s; social and economic changes associated with
globalization and "late modernity"; increased population diversity and
intergroup conflict; the effects of the women's, gay, and civil rights
movements; and increasingly global and sensationalistic media.
The nonfactors can be thought of in two ways. The first, precisely
because they affect all developed countries, and countries' penal poli-
cies and policy trends varied enormously, is that their invocation can
explain nothing. They are background conditions, no more. The sec-
ond is that they are necessary but not sufficient conditions, risk factors
of a sort but that lack independent explanatory or causal power.
Whether they influence policies depends on their interaction with
other risk and protective factors. In either case, though they may be
part of the story, they are not the important part.
B. Risk Factors
Knowledge about risk factors comes from two sources. The first is
the growing number of case studies of the development of crime con-
trol and punishment policies in individual countries. The most prom-
inent national risk factors include conflict political systems, elected
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judges and prosecutors, particular forms of sensationalist journalism,
Anglo-Saxon political cultures, and a predominant view that criminal
justice policy falls appropriately within the province of public opinion
and partisan politics. The second is a small number of statistical anal-
yses that test hypotheses about correlations between punitiveness and
national characteristics and policies not directly associated with crime
and punishment. Comparative risk factors they identify are income
inequality, weak social welfare systems, and low levels of perceived le-
gitimacy of governmental institutions. Lesser punitiveness is associated
with lower levels of income inequality, generous social welfare systems,
and high levels of trust in fellow citizens and in government.
1. Case Studies. Case studies in Europe have been accumulating
for a decade and are available for many countries, including Belgium,
Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, and Sweden. Case studies are also available for Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. The five national
features they highlight are general political culture, constitutional
structure, mass media characteristics, Anglo-Saxon culture, and sim-
plistic conceptions of democracy.
a. General Political Culture. Political scientists interested in com-
parative studies of political systems have long distinguished between
conflict and consensus political systems (e.g., Lijphart 1984, 1999).
Conflict systems are typically characterized by two major political par-
ties, first-past-the-post electoral systems, single-member electoral dis-
tricts, and policy discontinuities. Parties define their positions by con-
trast with those of their opponents, devote continuous efforts when
out of power to opposing the ruling party's policies, and campaign on
the basis of those oppositional differences. Not surprisingly, when one
party displaces another in power, it often rejects existing policies and
attempts to enact or implement those on which it ran for office.
Five primarily English-speaking countries 2 have conflict political
2 The "five primarily English-speaking countries" is an awkward phrase. It is meant
to include the subset of more populated wealthy, developed countries that were formerly
English colonies, in which English is the primary language, and which have common-
law adversary legal systems. Each has sizable minorities who speak other languages (e.g.,
French speakers in Canada, Hispanics in the United States). Sometimes, as in countries
with large Francophonic minorities, their presence may constitute a protective factor.
There are certainly other countries besides the five that arguably meet all the criteria
except "wealthy," such as India or some in the Caribbean and Africa.
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systems. Coalition governments are rare, including in Great Britain 3
and Canada, which have three major parties. In England, where the
Liberal Democrats sometimes receive a fifth to a quarter of votes cast
in national elections, the absence of proportional representation means
that their percentages of the raw vote translate into much lower per-
centages of parliamentary seats and their influence is slight compared
with that of the two major parties.
Consensus systems are typically characterized by numerous political
parties, proportional representation, coalition governments, and policy
continuity. The first three of these characteristics go together, and pol-
icy continuity is often a result. Where there are many political parties
and proportional representation, coalition governments are almost in-
evitable. Coalition governments necessarily include parties and indi-
vidual officials who subscribe to different views on major issues. Major
initiatives to succeed must gain support from the parties in the ruling
coalition. Because new elections may bring new parties into the ruling
coalition, policy processes generally include participation by parties not
in the coalition.
A new election may produce a new coalition including some parties
from the previous government together with parties that were previ-
ously outside the government. These features make radical policy
changes less likely than in conflict systems because some members of
the new government will have participated in shaping existing policies
and thus are likely to continue to support them. In addition, parties in
power after one election realize that they may be out of power after
the next one and have a continuing interest in policy processes that
are primarily substantive rather than primarily adversary lest policies
they support be quickly overturned.
Most western European countries have consensus political systems.
The Dutch for most of the twentieth century subscribed to the "polder
system" under which all major parties, and therefore the religious and
cultural groups they represented, participated in policy processes
" Usually I refer in this essay to England and Wales or England. The reason is that
England and Wales make up a legal system distinct from those of Scotland and Northern
Ireland, and it is the legal system of England and Wales that has experienced rapidly
rising imprisonment rates and extreme politicization of criminal justice policy. One of
the anomalies of the British constitutional scheme, however, is that the Parliament leg-
islating for England and Wales includes members from Northern Ireland and Scotland.
Labour in recent years has won a huge majority of Scottish seats in the British Parliament,
without which its control of Parliament would have been much less secure.
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(Downes, in this volume).14 In Belgium, the mainstream parties in re-
cent decades have sought consensus approaches to criminal justice is-
sues, sharing a general ambition to avoid politicization of policy mak-
ing, subscribing to widely shared views about humane policies, and
combining forces to obstruct the influence of the Vlaams Blok, a rad-
ical right-wing party (Snacken, in this volume). In Sweden, Norway,
Finland, and Denmark, policy processes are corporatist, involve wide
consultation inside and outside government, and generally unfold over
periods of years (Lappi-Seppili, in this volume).
Arend Lijphart, a leading scholar of comparative politics, over nearly
four decades has explored the nature and consequences of the consen-
sus/conflict model. In a recent major book (Lijphart 1999), he develops
two quantitative multifactor scales-a "parties-executives dimension"
and a "federal-unitary dimension"-to characterize governments. The
parties-executives dimension can be thought of as representing disper-
sion and concentration of political power. Thus one factor is "concen-
tration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus ex-
ecutive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions" (p. 3). Others are
strong versus weak executives and two-party versus multiparty systems.
Lijphart's "federal-unitary dimension" is a measure of constitutional
structures that disperse or concentrate authority. Factors include uni-
tary and centralized versus federal and decentralized governments, uni-
cameral versus bicameral legislatures, rigid versus flexible constitutions,
and the presence or absence of independent central banks and judicial
review of the constitutionality of laws.
The polar cases of majoritarian countries have highly concentrated
systems of political power and governmental authority (e.g., England
and New Zealand). The polar consensus countries have dispersed cen-
ters of political power and concentrated governmental authority (e.g.,
Sweden and Finland).
Lijphart tests whether governmental structures and political
traditions conducing to consensus policy processes are likelier to
achieve humane and democratic policy outcomes than conflict-model
governments. Using a variety of quantitative outcome measures, Lijp-
" A polder is an area of ground reclaimed from a sea or lake by means of dikes. Because
much of the Netherlands consists of lands reclaimed from the sea and protected by dikes,
a threat to the polders is a threat to everyone that requires that political and other
differences be set aside to face the emergency. The polder system in politics, based on
that metaphor, signified a view that group differences should be set aside in addressing
serious common problems of governance.
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hart concludes that consensus governments achieve greater gender eq-
uity, greener environmental policies, and more humane criminal justice
policies (measured relative to imprisonment rates and the death pen-
alty) than conflict-model governments do.
Figure 1, showing imprisonment rates for selected countries, is con-
sistent with this. Numbers shown in triangles next to country abbre-
viations are imprisonment rates per 100,000 population in 1996-98;
the parentheses show imprisonment rates in 2004-5. Locations of
countries are taken from Lijphart's analysis (1999, fig. 14.1). Countries
high on the "federal-unitary" vertical axis have relatively concentrated
systems of governmental authority, with unitary political systems at the
top and federal ones at the bottom. Countries falling toward the left
end of the horizontal "parties-executive" axis tend to be characterized
by dispersed political power and those on the right by its concentra-
tion.
Several patterns stand out. First, when one looks left to right, coun-
tries characterized by dispersal of political power, with only a few ex-
ceptions, have markedly lower imprisonment rates than those charac-
terized by concentration of political power. Second, dispersal of
political power is a better predictor than dispersal of governmental
authority. Nearly all the high-imprisonment countries fall on the right
side of the figure and nearly all the low-imprisonment countries on
the left. Third, high-imprisonment countries are almost equally char-
acterized by unitary and federal governmental structures.
Lijphart's model may appear static, but it is not. Political systems,
constitutional structures, and political cultures change over time. Pre-
dictions about how particular countries will react to changed condi-
tions also will change over time, depending on what the conditions are
and on the presence and absence of other risk and protective factors.
Finland, for example, an early twenty-first-century example of a coun-
try with a consensus political system, has had one of the lowest im-
prisonment rates in Europe since the early 1990s. For the fifty years
ending around 1985, however, it had one of the highest (Christie 1968;
Lappi-Seppaili, in this volume). Switzerland, an exemplar of prison rate
stability and moderate penal policies in recent decades, had rates
around 150 per 100,000 in the 1930s and 1940s (Killias 1991). The
United States experienced broadly stable imprisonment rates from
1930 through 1973, with a gradual decline that began in the early
1960s (Blumstein and Cohen 1973). During most of the period
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1930-73, American imprisonment rates were lower than Finland's. In
many years in the middle third of the last century, America's were
lower than Switzerland's. The Finnish and Swiss political systems,
however, have proved much more resilient than the American in re-
sponding to recent pressures for harsher policies and practices. For the
reasons given earlier in this subsection, there are plausible grounds for
believing that Lijphart's model provides useful information to efforts
to understand why countries have the penal policies they have.
b. Constitutional Structure.I" Politicization of criminal justice policy
is directly related to whether prosecutors and judges are selected po-
litically or meritocratically. It is also related to whether political and
constitutional conventions allow elected politicians to participate in de-
cision making about individual cases. Taken together, these two facets
of politicization fundamentally differentiate the United States and En-
gland from other Western countries, and they result from the obso-
lescence of their constitutions. Almost nowhere in western Europe, 6
Canada, or Australia are judges or prosecutors politically selected. And
almost nowhere do prevailing conventions justify a direct political voice
in punishment decisions.
i. Elections and Policy. The American Constitution dates from the
late eighteenth century, reflects eighteenth-century ideas, and was writ-
ten to address problems of that era. These were the colonists' major
objections to British rule: governance by a distant Parliament, capri-
cious actions by a distant government's imperious local representatives,
and the inability of citizens to seek redress for grievances. The prin-
cipal, Enlightenment, solutions in the Constitution centered on respect
for individual liberty and insulation from the power of an overweening
government. Protection of individual liberty was addressed by adoption
of the Bill of Rights creating fundamental personal rights (speech, re-
ligion, redress for grievances) and entitlements (jury trials, no unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, representation by counsel).
Protection from an overweening government was sought in two
" Discussions of the origins and precipitants of the constitutional structure of the
United States are based on Mullet (1966) and Wood (1969). Discussions of the origins
and precipitants of the English Bill of Rights and the constitutional structure of Great
Britain are based on Speck (1988), Williams and Ramsden (1990), and Cruickshanks(2000).
16 Switzerland, where prosecutors are locally elected, is the primary exception. In Swit-
zerland, however, the principles that political considerations are irrelevant in decisions
about individual cases and that cases should be resolved solely on their merits are strongly
held and seem to have insulated the system from politicization.
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ways. First, complicated systems of checks and balances were created
to fragment governmental power, principally by creating a strong hor-
izontal separation of powers among the three branches of the federal
government, and by a vertical differentiation of the spheres of interest
of the federal and the state governments (which in turn had their own
systems of horizontal and vertical separations of powers). Second, pro-
visions in the federal Constitution calling for frequent elections to the
House of Representatives (two years) 7 and presidency (four years), and
in state constitutions for frequent elections at county levels for state
legislators, judges, and prosecutors, were meant to push major elections
to local levels, at short intervals, and thereby make officials accountable
to local opinion. These structural arrangements also created a wide-
spread democratic ideology about the legitimate voice of public opin-
ion in relation to matters of policy.
The results more than 200 years later include in many states
traditions of partisan election of judges and prosecutors who run for
office on the basis of emotive appeals to the electorate." If the public
is anxious about crime or angry at criminals, or if particular cases be-
come notorious, there is nothing to stop prosecutors from seeking per-
sonal political benefit by posturing before public opinion or handling
cases in particular ways only because they have become notorious. Be-
cause local prosecutors are accountable through elections and are in
the executive branch of government, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that their discretionary decisions are effectively immune from judicial
review (allegations of corruption are the principal exception) (Borden-
kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 [1982]). Judges also are elected in most
states and know that decisions that are highly unpopular with much of
the public can lead to their defeat. Most chief prosecutors and many
judges aspire to be elected or appointed to higher political or judicial
office, which means that they must be concerned about controversies
that might diminish their future professional prospects, and they are
no doubt sometimes tempted to deal with a particular case in a partic-
ular way to curry popular approbation or avoid popular condemnation.
7 Like the House of Lords, or the much more recent (1867) Canadian Senate, the
U.S. Senate until 1913 consisted of senators who were not popularly elected (they were
elected by state legislatures).
"8 State laws, practices, and conventions vary widely, however. In a handful of states,
chief prosecutors are not popularly elected and are organized at the state rather than
county levels. In some states, judicial selection is handled under nonpartisan, merit se-
lection procedures.
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And, if criminal justice issues are openly politicized and polemicized
in local elections of judges and prosecutors, it is not surprising that
candidates for state and federal legislatures and governor and president
do likewise.
The constitution of England and Wales dates partly from the Magna
Carta (1215), when the central issue was the division of power between
the monarchy and the nobility, and from the English Bill of Rights
(1689) that punctuated the Glorious Revolution that brought William
of Orange to the throne. Then the central issue again was the relative
power of the monarchy and the political classes and the solution was
Parliamentary Supremacy, the doctrine that the elected Parliament is
supreme in all matters of governance. There is nothing in the Bill of
Rights about fundamental liberties of citizens enforceable against the
state, limits on governmental power, judicial independence, or sepa-
ration of powers. The conventional theoretical justification given for
Parliamentary Supremacy is that it effectuates representative democ-
racy. The citizens elect the government, and to carry out its program,
it must have unobstructed power. If the public disapproves, it can vote
the government out of office in the next election.
The absence of a Bill of Rights or a system of separation of powers
is not surprising. The main issue in contention in the Glorious Rev-
olution was relations between the monarchy and the political classes
143 years before England established broad-based adult male suffrage
in 1832. The revolution's aim was to confirm the power of the political
classes by limiting the power of the monarch; the notion that the power
of the political classes should also be limited was not on the agenda.
The doctrine of separation of powers and the idea of an entrenched
bill of individual rights were Enlightenment ideas that had not yet
taken shape. As a result, there is neither in principle nor in practice a
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The judiciary cannot
review the constitutional adequacy of legislation or executive action. 9
The Lord Chancellor (the incumbent early in 2007, Lord Falconer, a
one-time university roommate of Prime Minister Tony Blair) is si-
multaneously head of the judiciary, a member of the legislature (the
House of Lords), and a member of the prime minister's cabinet. The
"Under the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts are empowered to decide whether
British laws or practices comply with the European Convention of Human Rights, but
not to issue remedial orders or strike down a law held to be not in compliance. Only
the Parliament has power to revise or rescind noncompliant laws.
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executive controls the House of Commons, and the highest court (also
called the House of Lords) is part of that legislative chamber.
The problems of politicization and polemicization take a different
shape in England than in America. The problem in America is that
governmental structure was meant to tie officials closely to community
needs and beliefs and democratic ideology celebrated the importance
and influence of public opinion, even if it was ill-informed, mercurial,
or mean-spirited. Drafters of the Constitution worried about the dan-
gers of "mobocracy," but, with local notable exceptions, the problem
did not fully take shape until late in the twentieth century when ubiq-
uitous electronic and broadcast media meant that a horrible incident
anywhere, and ensuing emotionalism, could sweep across an entire
continent.
The situation in England is different. England and Wales suffers
from having a unitary legal system, with the government, the bureauc-
racy, and the mass media in one place, London. A single horrifying
incident anywhere in the country becomes a national cause c6lbre,
and government often appears to feel obliged to propose changes to
national laws to assure that something similar does not happen again.
If the government of the day chooses to act illiberally and to polit-
icize criminal justice policy, there are no competing governmental
power centers to stop it. Of course, individual officials can speak out.
Sometimes members of the House of Lords try to influence legislation,
but the Lords' power is one only of delay. The House of Commons,
controlled by the government, can always override the House of Lords.
The Labour government, partly for cynical electoral reasons, chose in
the early 1990s to politicize criminal justice policy (Windlesham
1987-96; Dunbar and Langdon 1998; Morgan and Downes 2007) and
has adhered to that approach ever since. For reasons presumably ul-
timately known only to themselves, Tony Blair and a series of Home
Secretaries (most radically David Blunkett and John Reid) have for a
decade promoted unrelievedly repressive criminal justice policies in
England (Tonry 2004a; Newburn, in this volume).2 ' The centralization
of governmental power in England, and the absence of competing
2" Home Secretary David Blunkett, on learning that serial killer Harold Shipman had
committed suicide in prison, commented, "You wake up and you receive a phone call
telling you that Shipman has topped himself. And you think, is it too early to open a
bottle?" (Charter et al. 2004).
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power centers, make it possible for a determined government to do
what it wants.
ii. Elections and Individual Cases. A second consequence of English
and American constitutional structure is that politicians feel entitled to
express views about the dispositions of individual cases. Sometimes,
incredibly to lawyers in other countries, this extends literally to want-
ing to influence or make decisions about individual cases. The English
Home Secretary, for as long as there has been a system of parole re-
lease, has claimed the right to decide personally when individual pris-
oners are released. During some periods since the 1960s, parole boards
reviewed individual prisoners' petitions for release, but their decisions
were recommendations to the Home Secretary, who could reject them.
Probably most notoriously in recent years, until in each case the Eu-
ropean Court ruled otherwise, both the Lord Chief Justice and the
Home Secretary claimed the right to second-guess, and to increase,
the sentences imposed by the trial judge on the two preteenage mur-
derers in 1993 of two-year-old James Bulger (Green, in this volume).
More generally, legislators and executive branch officials in England
and America (and less often those in Canada and Australia) feel entitled
to propose and enact laws that prescribe sentences in individual cases,
thereby removing the judge's authority to impose a sentence that is
appropriate under all the circumstances. Such laws are much more
common in America and include three-strikes laws in more than half
the states, mandatory minimum sentence laws in all states (though they
vary widely in scope), and mandatory sentencing guidelines in North
Carolina (and until the U.S. Supreme Court held them unconstitu-
tional, in the federal system). Such laws also exist in England, where
two- and three-strikes laws were enacted in the Crime (Sentences) Act
1997 that prescribed mandatory minimum sentences for repeat bur-
glaries, repeat violent crimes, and some drug trafficking offenses, and
where murder is subject to a mandatory life sentence. Canadian and
Australian legislators have dipped their toes in these waters, not deeply
(Freiberg 2001; Webster and Doob, in this volume). Few other coun-
ties have.
Writing the preceding paragraph has led me finally to understand
an argument that has heretofore escaped me. Andrew Ashworth (e.g.,
2001) has several times attributed to English High Court judges the
view that mandatory minimum sentence legislation is unconstitutional.
Ashworth indicated his disagreement, arguing (inevitably, it seems to
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me, in a country characterized by Parliamentary Supremacy) that leg-
islators inherently have power to set maximum sentences, which they
have long exercised, and minimum sentences if they so choose. Ash-
worth noted that enacting a law of general scope was different from
telling a judge what to do in an individual case. That seemed right to
me, and inexorable. I could not understand what the judges could have
meant. Now I think I do, and I suspect that judges in many other
countries would agree with their English peers. In a country with an
independent judiciary, judges must have the authority, under law, to
find the facts of individual cases and to apply the applicable law to
those facts and to determine an appropriate remedy. For an executive
branch official, or a legislature, to direct a particular factual determi-
nation or a particular remedy in a case subjudice would fundamentally
undermine the institution of an independent judiciary, substituting pos-
sibly self-interested political or policy considerations for impartial ju-
dicial ones. The step from that to a mandatory minimum sentence law
is but a small one. Such a law tells the judge precisely what he or she
should decide, irrespective of case-level circumstances, and does not
allow impartial consideration within a framework of law of the most
appropriate sentence in a particular case. Ashworth, I now think, is
surely right as a matter of English constitutional law, but wrong as a
matter of post-Enlightenment constitutional values.
No other Western countries have constitutions primarily designed
to address political problems of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. All include entrenched bills of rights, and all reflect the influ-
ence of eighteenth-century ideas about governmental separation of
powers. Most reflect a pluralistic twentieth-century world and call for
electoral systems of proportional representation. Most are generally
governed by multiparty coalitions. Most in Europe, Great Britain (in-
cluding perforce England) being the notable exception, accept the Eu-
ropean Convention of Human Rights as part of their national consti-
tutional law and accept decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights as binding and self-executing.2 No major English-speaking or
2 See n. 19. Although England and Wales is bound by treaty obligation to accept the
court's rulings, they can be implemented only if the English government affirmatively
acts to do so. An illustration may make the importance of this clear. If an American court
ruled that particular conditions in a prison were unconstitutional, it would issue an order
so declaring and a remedial order; the prison would be obliged to act on the order, an
obligation the court could enforce if need be by exercise of its contempt powers. Were
the European Court to declare the same conditions in a British prison a violation of the
European Convention, the individual prison would not be obligated to comply if the
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western European country but Switzerland has popular elections for
prosecutors, and none hold popular elections for judges. The consti-
tutional features of American and English government make both
countries particularly susceptible to the wholesale politicization of
criminal justice policy.
c. Mass Media Characteristics. Ubiquitous mass media are part of
the twenty-first century as, to some degree at least everywhere, are
sensationalistic media. David Green (in this volume; forthcoming)
shows the different ways that Norwegian and English print media char-
acteristics affected how those countries reacted to notorious killings of
small children by slightly older children. In England, where the tabloid
media are highly sensationalistic and openly and vigorously promote
populist approaches to crime, the James Bulger story received front-
page coverage for many days, on anniversaries of his death, and when-
ever developments occurred in the cases of his killers, including their
releases from prison at age eighteen. In Norway, after Silje Rederg~rd's
killing, the media covered the story only for a few days, in a manner
that was not sensationalistic, and did not return to the story later on.
Among characteristics that might explain the difference is that most
Norwegian newspapers are sold by subscription rather than, as in En-
gland, from newsstands. As a consequence, there is less of a premium
on eye- and attention-catching headlines and front-page pictures. An-
other distinguishing characteristic is that the leading Norwegian tab-
loid is much less sensational than those in England. The English tab-
loids (the Sun, the Daily Mail, the Mirror, the News of the World), which,
though published in London, have national circulations like those of
all other major English newspapers, have much the largest circulations
in the country. They dwarf those of the "quality" broadsheets (The
Times, the Guardian, the Independent, and the Telegraph). Since the early
1990s, Labour Party leaders have made it clear that they pay greatest
attention to the tabloid papers and often regard them as valid indicators
of popular attitudes and beliefs (Green, in this volume22 ).
contested conditions were in compliance with British law. As a practical matter, British
governments do comply with European Court decisions, but carefully protecting the
posture that compliance was a matter of choice.
22 Green relates two anecdotes, based on published sources, of occasions when Tony
Blair indicated that government in making policy should treat as true things a media-
influenced public believed to be true, even when government information established
that it was not (e.g., that crime is increasing when both official police data and victim
survey data show it to be decreasing).
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Media characteristics vary widely between countries. The remarkable
and pernicious influence of the English tabloids on crime policy results
from an interaction between the tabloid media's sensationalizing style
and the Labour government's decision to pay particular attention to
the tabloids and to attempt to win their support (Morgan and Downes
2007). It is not a coincidence that Blair's primary media advisor for
nearly a decade was Alistair Campbell, a former political editor of the
Daily Mirror. Because, as discussed below, governments in most West-
ern countries rely more heavily on expert and professional opinion in
formulating policy than the English government does (Tonry 2004a),
most would likely not be as influenced by sensationalistic media (were
their media as sensationalistic as England's, which at least for the coun-
tries discussed in this volume does not seem to be the case).
d. Anglo-Saxon Culture. Although it is not at all clear what it is
about Anglo-Saxon culture that makes predominantly English-speaking
countries especially punitive, they are. Not only does the United States
lead the international imprisonment rate league tables for western Eu-
ropean and English-speaking countries by a factor of five (more than
750 per 100,000 in 2007 compared with runners-up), but the runners-
up in 2005 were New Zealand (186 per 100,000) and England (148
per 100,000) (Walmsley 2007). Canada and Australia, typically around
100-110 per 100,000, are lower but well above the levels of 60-80 per
100,000 that have characterized the Scandinavian countries since 1990
and the 80-90 that has long characterized Germany, Switzerland,
France, and Belgium. The punitiveness of the Anglo-Saxon countries
is confirmed by International Crime Victims Survey findings that have
consistently shown since the initial wave of data collection in 1989 that
respondents in the United States, England, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland are substantially more severe in their punishment preferences
than other Europeans or Canadians (van Dijk et al. 2007).
Possibly what appears to be the influence of Anglo-Saxon culture is
something about constitutional structures or residual influence of his-
torical British penal culture on its former colonies. Or it could be
related to economies that are more capitalistic and political cultures
that are less social democratic than those of most European countries.
Or, it could have something to do with the Protestant religions with
strong Calvinist overtones that were long influential. In this they share
a common characteristic with the Netherlands, which is rapidly achiev-
ing the highest imprisonment rate among Western countries after the
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English-speakers. Whatever it is, it is most conspicuously present when
comparisons are made with Francophonic cultures.
e. Populist Conceptions of Democracy. In England, Labour govern-
ment spokesmen and policy statements in recent years repeatedly
promised to "rebalance the criminal justice system in favour of the
victim" and reestablish "public confidence" (e.g., Home Office 2002,
p. 14). Implicit in these catchphrases are implications that public opin-
ion should importantly shape both what general policies are adopted
and what punishments offenders receive. These are very different as-
sertions, which I consider below.
Anthony Bottoms (1995) is commonly credited with coining the
phrase "populist punitiveness," by which he seemed to mean to char-
acterize a set of public attitudes that was more punitive toward crimes
and less sympathetic toward offenders than in earlier times, and to
which policy makers were, or at least felt, obliged to respond. More
recently, other English-speaking academics (e.g., Ryan 2003; Loader
2006; Pratt 2007) have described an unbrave new world in which the
public will no longer allow experts and professionals to play major roles
in dealing with crime. The genie of populist punitiveness, "untutored
public emotion toward crime and punishment," is out of the bottle,
they suggest, and will not be put back (Loader 2006, p. 582). Loader,
in an article about "Platonic guardians," his mocking term for liberal-
minded English professionals who in earlier times played larger policy-
making roles than they do now, suggests that populist policy ap-
proaches may not be a bad thing: "The idea that crime should be kept
out of public life, safely handled by a coterie of experts, was and re-
mains profoundly antidemocratic" (p. 582).23
Several things should be said about populist conceptions of democ-
racy. The first is that, at least in a European context, Bottoms, Ryan,
and Loader describe a distinctively British phenomenon (assuming, as
they argue, that it exists there24). The practical import of populist views
23 Strikingly, and oddly inconsistently, since the tenor of Loader's article is disparage-
ment of "liberal elitism," and its efforts to insulate policy making from raw public emotion
and electoral politics, in his penultimate sentence he warns that politicization of crime
policy "is to play with passions that cannot easily be regulated, to foster expectations that
are not easily sated, and to create spirals of outrage, desire, and disappointment that have
the potential to overwhelm and undermine the institutional architecture of liberal de-
mocracy" (Loader 2006, p. 583).
24 1 provide evidence elsewhere that the Labour government's preoccupation with crime
prevention and antisocial behavior has heightened public anxieties and dissatisfactions
(Tonry 2004a); English populist punitiveness may be no more than the unintended reified
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of penal policy concerns the relative weight to be given in policy mak-
ing to public attitudes and opinions compared with professional knowl-
edge and experience. In most Western countries, with England and the
United States being the closest to exceptions, professional views matter
and are seen as a legitimate basis for formulation of policy. As the
essays in this volume on Belgium (Snacken), Canada (Webster and
Doob), France (Levy, Roch6), and the four large Scandinavian coun-
tries (Lappi-Seppili) make clear, policy makers in all those places con-
tinue, seemingly comfortably, to set policies largely in accordance with
their professional judgments.
Second, in thinking about the degree to which public opinion is an
appropriate element in criminal justice policy making, an important
distinction needs to be made between general policies and decisions
about particular cases. Few officials in any Western country would ar-
gue that public attitudes and beliefs are inappropriate considerations
in setting general policies, within certain limits. Concerning decisions
about individual cases, by contrast, few officials in any country would
argue that consideration of public attitudes and beliefs is appropriate
(England being a possible exception, as the history of the Bulger case
suggests). A primary purpose behind the historical creation of profes-
sional courts and impartial judges was to shelter decisions in individual
cases from the influence of public emotion and vigilantism. Even if
"populist punitiveness" exists in some meaningful new way, most policy
makers and practitioners in most countries believe that it has no role
to play in deciding individual cases.
Third, a tension between citizens' rights and state powers has been
evident since the Enlightenment, and most developed countries in
many spheres are attempting to strengthen individual rights. The
evolving role and broadening reach of the European Court and Con-
vention of Human Rights exemplify this, as well as the work of the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Morgan 2001), the International
Criminal Court, and numerous efforts to develop international decla-
rations and covenants of rights.
Those developments reflect a view that, at day's end, the rights and
interests of individual citizens should trump the political preferences
consequence of strategic political choices to make crime and punishment a government
policy preoccupation.
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of others who would disregard them. Just as policy makers in most
developed countries had little compunction about abolishing capital
punishment in the face of public opposition, there is no reason why
government should rule by plebiscite when lesser but still inhumane
penal impositions are in issue.
Rejecting the salience of plebiscite-type views of emotional subjects
is not antidemocratic. Here is why. Ordinary citizens often see things
in black and white that, had they more information, they would view
in shades of grey. This is Dan Yankelovich's (1991) distinction between
public opinion (top-of-the-head opinions elicited by pollsters' supper-
time phone calls) and public judgment (what people believe when they
have adequate information and opportunity to consider opposing view-
points and arguments). Citizens' views about crime and punishment,
often emotional, exemplify public opinion when public judgment is
what is needed. This is a major justification for institutions of repre-
sentative government. That many European countries, and Canada,
have managed more successfully than the United States and England
to insulate criminal justice policy making, and decisions in individual
cases, from the force of raw public opinion is a major reason why their
policies are less punitive and more humane.
2. Statistical Analyses. A different way to search for explanations is
to develop plausible hypotheses of relations between national charac-
teristics and differences in punitiveness and then look for quantitative
measures of those characteristics. Ken Pease (1991) was one of the first
to do this and concluded that higher national imprisonment rates were
associated with larger degrees of income inequality. A later analysis by
Katherine Beckett and Bruce Western (2001) reached similar results in
comparisons of welfare spending and imprisonment rates of American
states. A number of theories might support these findings: greater in-
equalities in income might produce greater status differentiation and
with it greater selfishness among the privileged and less sympathy with
people in socially distant social strata. Or, greater status differentiation
might undermine social solidarity and thus produce a greater need to
rely on legal threats rather than informal social control to regulate
behavior.
Two more recent studies have tested a wider range of hypotheses
and variables (Downes and Hansen 2006; Lappi-Seppiala, forthcoming).
Both confirmed Pease's findings that greater income inequality within
a country is associated with higher imprisonment rates. They also
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found that higher imprisonment rates were associated with lower levels
of welfare spending, lower levels of trust in fellow citizens, and lower
public perceptions of the legitimacy of the legal system.
C. Protective Factors
Prominent protective factors include consensus political systems,
nonpartisan judges and prosecutors, Francophonic political cultures,
and a predominant view that criminal justice policy falls appropriately
within the province of expert knowledge and professional experience.
David J. Smith in personal communication has advised that develop-
mentalists do not see risk and protective factors simply as reciprocals
(as "having attention deficit disorder" and "not having attention deficit
disorder" might be thought to be). The four protective factors I iden-
tify here do not fall prey to that objection. Francophonic and Anglo-
Saxon cultures are patently not opposites: no one would regard "not
Francophonic" and Anglo-Saxon as synonyms. Consensus and conflict
political cultures and populist and expert-based policy processes are
poles on continuums containing a range of possibilities. The difference
between elected (or politically selected) noncareer officials and merito-
cratically chosen career officials is far from being the same as "A" and
"not A."
1. Consensus Political Cultures. No country offers a pure case of a
consensus or conflict political culture, but as Lijphart's (1999) descrip-
tions of individual countries' governmental arrangements make clear,
some countries, especially in northern and western Europe, have much
more consensus-based processes than others. In none of those coun-
tries has crime control become a recurring or defining partisan political
issue, and in none has a felt need emerged as in the United States and
England for major parties to address perceived popular anger by means
of wholesale adoption of expressive tough-on-crime policies.
The Netherlands is the most interesting country along this dimen-
sion. It has long been an exemplar of a consensus-based political cul-
ture. Although governmental policy documents beginning in the mid-
1980s regularly alluded to public anxieties about crime and public
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system's "leniency" (Downes
and van Swaaningen 2007), the imprisonment rate has risen steadily
for a third of a century without enactment of new sentencing laws
meant to accomplish that, and without crime becoming a major par-
tisan political issue. Whatever has happened in the Netherlands has
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operated osmotically. The criminal justice system has become incre-
mentally more severe over an extended period. Practitioners at each
stage appear to have become harsher: police more likely to refer cases
for prosecution, prosecutors more often to insist on a negotiated set-
tlement (a "transaction") or to initiate court proceedings, judges more
often to impose prisons sentences and for longer terms (Tak 2001). In
contrast to England and the United States, where steadily harshening
policies and practices produced steep increases in imprisonment,
changed practices almost alone did the job in the Netherlands. No one
has as yet fully and convincingly explained what happened (though
Downes [in this volume] and Downes and van Swaaningen [2007] have
made important beginnings).
A protective factor is not a guarantee, as the Netherlands case dem-
onstrates. It makes an undesirable outcome less likely.
2. Professional Cadres. Only in the United States are judges and
prosecutors elected or selected according to openly partisan criteria or
are those roles structured in ways that make officials strongly suscep-
tible to influence by public opinions and emotions. In most civil-law
countries, judges and prosecutors are career civil servants who select
those career paths while in university law schools and immediately
upon graduation start work. Individuals may have careers as judges or
as prosecutors only, or occasionally change track. The more talented
or successful gradually move up career ladders and when they reach
positions of substantial authority have spent a professional lifetime ab-
sorbing norms of professionalism, political nonpartisanship, and im-
partiality.
In European countries not following the professional civil servant
model, conventions of political neutrality and professional impartiality
are strong. In Belgium and Switzerland, for example, many judges are
selected by the Parliament, but professional norms of independence
and impartiality are strong. In Canada, judges are appointed according
to meritocratic criteria in processes that include nonpartisan screening
committees. In England, judges and prosecutors receive no specialized
legal training in their university courses. Prosecutors are national civil
servants who tend to enter the Crown Prosecution Service early in
their careers. Judges are selected through nonpartisan screening pro-
cesses. Both professions under the prevailing professional legal culture
are rigorously nonpolitical.
Those nonpartisan, nonpolitical appointment processes conduce to
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impartiality and independence. By contrast, the methods by which
American judges and prosecutors are selected carry large risks of po-
liticization. Chief prosecutors must always worry about the effects of
notorious cases or controversial policies on their reelection prospects
(lest their opponents have evidence to support charges of being soft
on crime). Elected judges, usually less acutely, face similar risks. Many
prosecutors and judges aspire to election or appointment to higher or
more powerful roles and must be sensitive to the impressions they
create in the minds of people in positions to advance or impede their
upward progress. The dangers that prosecutorial policies will be based
on election promises, opinion surveys, or focus groups are not small.
Nor is the risk that decisions in individual cases will be affected by
what the judge or prosecutor believes to be his or her professional or
personal self interest.
3. Francophonic Culture. It is striking that the three French-speak-
ing areas discussed in the essays in this volume (France, Francophonic
Belgium, and Quebec) are all places characterized by comparatively
mild penal policies. In none of them is populist punitiveness a force to
be reckoned with, and none of them has adopted conspicuously harsh
or primarily expressive policies.
Quebec's sentencing practices for adults are among the least punitive
in Canada, and its practices toward young offenders are the least pu-
nitive (Doob and Sprott 2004; Doob and Webster 2006). Canada's
relatively stable penal policies and imprisonment rates over recent de-
cades are sometimes attributed in part to the influence in Ottawa of
the Quebecois. Criminal and criminal procedure codes in Canada are
national, though enforcement and implementation are provincial. Be-
cause they will apply to Quebec and Canadian national politics has
been haunted for decades by the specter of possible Quebec secession,
it is not hard to understand why strong Quebecois preferences are
taken seriously.
The role of the French-speaking Walloons in Belgium is similar.
Belgium is a country in which the roles of experts are large and in
which policies have not become greatly more punitive. Within, how-
ever, that relatively benign climate, the Walloons appear to be less
punitive that the Dutch-speaking Flemish. Sonja Snacken (in this vol-
ume) gives an example. When national law authorized and funded
agencies to look after victims' interests, the Flemish created an agency
in 1985 to address victims' services and needs. In 1989 the Walloons
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created combined victims' and offenders' services centers. In 1994 the
Dutch-speaking authority changed course and adopted the French
speakers' more inclusive approach.
France, for another example, has adopted, though seldom applied,
some tougher sentencing laws, but it has also developed a wide range
of diversion and alternatives programs, abolished the death penalty,
made its juvenile system less punitive, and experienced only a slight
increase in its imprisonment rate over the past thirty years (Roch6, in
this volume). The best example, however, of French exceptionalism is
the long-established practice of promulgation of wide-based amnesties
and pardons at times of national celebration (presidential inaugura-
tions; national holidays such as the 200th anniversary of the storming
of the Bastille) (LUvy, in this volume). Sometimes thousands of people
are pardoned or released from prison and the imprisonment rate falls
by 10 or 20 percent in a short period. Such practices would be un-
thinkable in many countries. Some would condemn them for arbitrarily
freeing offenders from the appropriate and morally deserved conse-
quences of their crimes. Others would fault the unfairness of punishing
some offenders less severely than their like-situated brethren. Presum-
ably French men and women just shrug.
4. Expert-Informed Policy Processes. Criminal justice is a potentially
more tumultuous policy subject than most. People have strong views
about health, education, or transportation policies, of course, but usu-
ally for immediately self-interested or general disinterested reasons.
Criminal justice is different because it involves horrifying incidents,
innocent victims, and sometimes seriously unappealing or frightening
offenders. Together these can provoke powerful emotions, moral pan-
ics, and waves of public vindictiveness and outrage. Everyone knows
that people affected by powerful emotions sometimes overreact or be-
have in ways they later regret. Actions taken under the influence of
vengeful or vindictive sentiments likewise, everyone knows, are often
regretted. Moral panics produce everything from unjust laws to ill-
considered practices to unjust actions. These are all reasons why every
account of the development of state legal systems stresses their aims
to remove cases from the immediate influence of private emotion and
to assure that cases be dealt with impartially and dispassionately under
established laws and procedures. That is why images such as blind
justice and ideals such as impartial justice exist.
Vigilante justice is self-evidently wrong because its actions are too
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often ill-considered, impulsive, and excessive. And when powerful emo-
tions are let loose, the people punished by vigilantes are too often the
wrong people. Lynch mobs seldom exercise due diligence.
The same logic applies to policy making. From Kai Ericson's (1966)
classic account of the Salem witch trials through Stanley Cohen's
(1972) account of the Clacton "riots" to Philip Jenkins's accounts
(1998) of recurring panics about child sexual abuse, the literature on
moral panics shows how overwrought lawmakers and officials some-
times act unwisely and unjustly under the influence of powerful emo-
tion. Waves of emotion can pass through a community or a country
and policy makers can lose their heads.
Countries in which experts and professionals play major roles in
policy making, such as most of those in western and northern Europe,
are less likely to adopt highly punitive policies in general or during
waves of emotional reaction to a horrible incident, than countries in
which expert and professional voices have become less influential.
IV Learning More, Doing Better
The determinants of changes in penal policies are complex and con-
tingent. Most broad explanatory claims are wrong. Most of what is said
that is sensible, and can be said, however, is anecdotal and impression-
istic. This final section suggests a number of things that might be done
to make our inquiries more systematic and our generalizations better
grounded.
First, the effort to explain the emergence of a ubiquitous, monolithic
"new punitiveness" or "punitive turn" (Brown 2005, p. 282) needs to
be replaced with efforts to explain many things. As most of the essays
in this volume demonstrate, lots of different things pointing in differ-
ent directions are happening in lots of places, and the explanations for
them cannot be the same. However, several essays in a recent collection
on "the new punitiveness" (Pratt et al. 2005) contain statements like
this: "The most theoretically sophisticated explanations for this puni-
tive turn and the rapid increase in imprisonment rates across the West
have increasingly looked to more general changes in social, political,
economic, and cultural organization rather than to any specific forces
confined to criminal justice sphere, in short to the conditions of life in
'late modernity' (Brown 2005, p. 27). As the essays in this volume,
and several in the Pratt et al. (2005) volume itself (e.g., Bondeson 2005;
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Meyer and O'Malley 2005; Nelken 2005) make clear, in many coun-
tries no dramatic "punitive turn" has been taken and imprisonment
rates have not risen rapidly. Better answers are unlikely to emerge until
we start to ask better questions.
Second, much of the armchair "theoretical" writing on changes in
penal policy is useless, assuming that a "punitive turn" has occurred,
which it then tries to explain without bothering to establish whether
policies and practices have changed and in what ways. David Garland's
work (e.g., 2001) has inspired much armchair theorizing. While no
informed person would deny that Garland's writing is insightful and
provocative, there are few David Garlands. A recent exchange in Pun-
ishment and Society between Bryan Hogeveen (2005, 2006) and Anthony
Doob and Jane Sprott (2006a, 2006b) is illustrative. Hogeveen dis-
cussed "how the [social construction of the] punishable young offender
has been manifest in, and governed through, increasingly harsh pen-
alties, austere punishments and high rates of incarceration" and how
the Canadian government in the late 1990s sought to denounce "youth
crime through tougher youth justice legislation (the Youth Criminal
Justice Act)" (2005, p. 73). Hogeveen made a number of empirical
claims: "The punishable young offender was manifest in harsher sen-
tences meted out for juvenile deviance" (p. 80); "throughout the 1980s
and the 1990s Canada's rate of incarceration for young offenders con-
tinued to climb" (p. 81); "from 1991 to 1997 while American rates for
incarceration were remaining relatively stable, Canadian rates were
steadily increasing" (p. 81); "with few exceptions, during the 1990s
Canadian youth justice moved in the direction of greater punitiveness
as reflected in increasing rates of imprisonment and harsher penalties
for the most serious and violent young offenders" (p. 86). None of
those assertions is empirically demonstrable, raising some question as
to what exactly it was that Hogeveen attempted to explain.
Doob and Sprott showed that none of Hogeveen's empirical asser-
tions were accurate: "Hogeveen's empirical assertions were without
empirical foundation. There are no data in either of his two articles
(Hogeveen 2005, this issue [2006]) (or anywhere else that we know of)
that support his assertions that sentences got harsher during the late
1990s or that the rate of incarceration of youth increased during this
period for offenders generally or for the most serious and violent of-
fenders" (2006a, p. 478). Time, energy, and paper would be much bet-
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ter expended on trying to understand and explain real developments
in the real world.
Third, if we want to understand why particular policies and practices
emerge in particular places at particular times, we will need much more
nuanced accounts of what has happened and much more imaginative
efforts to explain why (e.g., Brodeur, in this volume). Explanations will
not be found in rising crime rates, globalization, ontological insecurity,
late modernity, or postmodernist angst. They explain too much and
therefore too little. Adequate explanations will need to look at a wide
range of developments that need explaining (table 2 includes many
candidates). When a wide range of factors is taken into account, dif-
ferences between countries become clearer. When incarceration rates
are used as the sole indicator of increased punitiveness, the United
States stands alone with New Zealand (Pratt and Clark 2005; Pratt
2006), England, and the Netherlands far behind but still well above
the rates of most of western Europe.2" When all the factors in table 2
are considered, however, England26 stands alone after the United States
in increasing punitiveness by nearly every policy measure except capital
punishment-mandatory sentences, longer sentences, more pretrial de-
tention, increased processing of young offenders in adult courts, more
punitive alternatives, and weakened procedural protections (Tonry
2004a). Canada and the Netherlands, by contrast, have adopted fewer
punitive policies, and some of those adopted-for example, concerning
juveniles-have not produced more punitive practices.
A new generation of comparative studies will have to go deeper in
trying to explain why countries differ in important respects that seem
to shape their penal policies. Matters of constitutional structure, for
example, partly explain why the United States and England have
adopted much more repressive policies than many other countries. In
times of recurring moral panics about crime and drugs, America's sys-
tem of dispersed governmental powers, election of judges and prose-
cutors, and frequent legislative elections made policy makers suscep-
tible to powerful influence by transient but widely shared public
" Because most of the exiguous literature concerns western Europe and the Anglo-
phonic common-law countries, and because they share many common cultural, economic,
and historical characteristics, the text of this essay is limited to them. In recent decades,
Russia and South Africa have had imprisonment rates from 350 to 550 per 100,000;
eastern European rates generally vary between 150 and 300 per 100,000; and those in
most Asian countries vary between 20 and 50 per 100,000.
26 New Zealand possibly also, it appears (Pratt 2006, 2007).
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emotions. Thirty-five years of "law and order" and an imprisonment
rate of 750 per 100,000 are among the results. Switzerland, however,
also has a system of widely dispersed governmental authority, elects
prosecutors at local elections, and holds frequent legislative elections
and policy referenda, but has experienced broadly stable penal policies
and practices over several decades
The English Labour government's decision to adopt and implement
a wide range of increasingly punitive policies and practices over the
past decade was made much easier by the concentration of political
power in England and Wales. That, however, cannot be the whole
answer. If a concentrated system of political power is part of the En-
glish explanation and dispersed political power is part of the American,
other important influences must be at work.
The Netherlands and Belgium provide a similar contrast. In neither
country has law-and-order politics had powerful influence and in nei-
ther country have policies become pronouncedly harsher. The two
countries share similar distributions of political power and govern-
mental authority. Yet imprisonment rates, in particular, and a wide
range of practices became progressively harsher over three decades in
the Netherlands, and imprisonment rates rose as much in percentage
terms after 1973 as in the United States. Belgium, by contrast, main-
tained broadly stable penal policies and practices.
Cultural and other normative explanations must explain why the
United States and Switzerland have adopted such different policies and
experienced such different practices, and why the Dutch and Belgian
penal policy stories are so different. Explanations may be found in
distinctive features of national history and culture, in the influence of
particular systems of religious belief, or, following Lijphart (1999), in
political culture.
Risk and protective factors are no more destinies for countries than
for individuals. Distributions of political power and governmental au-
thority, constitutional structure, media characteristics, career profes-
sionals, and deference to expert knowledge do not produce particular
results. They make them more or less likely. We could understand a
good bit more about these things than we now do.
Winston Churchill nearly a century ago (in 1910) observed:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any coun-
try. A calm, dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused
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and even of the convicted criminal, . . . tireless efforts towards the
discovery of curative and re-generative processes; unfailing faith
that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of ev-
ery man. These are the symbols which, in the treatment of crime
and the criminal, mark and measure the stored-up strength of a
nation, and are the sign and proof of the living virtue within it.
(Quoted in Radzinowicz and Hood 1986, p. 774)
Countries differ widely in how they respond to crime and criminals.
We can learn much more about why they differ and maybe provide
insights that may help some countries better mark their stored-up
strength and better prove their living virtue.
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